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Reading Together and Apart: Juries, 
Courts, and Substantial Similarity in 
Copyright Law 
Laura A. Heymann* 
In 1994, the Honda Motor Company launched a new television 
commercial for its Honda del Sol convertible.1 Intended to highlight the car’s 
detachable rooftop, the commercial was developed over two years, at one 
point carrying the project name of “James Bob.”2 As described in a district 
court opinion, the commercial’s focus was “a fast-paced helicopter chase 
scene featuring a suave hero and an attractive heroine [in a Honda del Sol], 
as well as a menacing and grotesque villain”3 who jumped out of the 
helicopter onto the top of the car but was then sent flying when the hero 
detached the Honda’s roof.4 The hero wore a tuxedo, both characters spoke 
with a British accent, and the commercial featured bright, horn-driven music 
throughout.5 
After Metro–Goldwyn–Mayer, Inc. (“MGM”), the owner of the rights in 
the James Bond film franchise, saw the commercial, it immediately demanded 
that Honda take the commercial off the air.6 When Honda refused, MGM 
filed suit, alleging, among other things, copyright infringement.7 In an 
attempt to resolve the dispute before the commercial’s Super Bowl airing, 
Honda changed the characters’ accents to American and altered the music.8 
Still not appeased, MGM moved for a preliminary injunction.9 
 
 *  Vice Dean and Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. Many thanks to Mark 
Badger and Andrew Gilden for their helpful comments. 
 1.  Metro–Goldwyn–Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1291–92 
(C.D. Cal. 1995). 
 2.  Id. at 1291. 
 3.  Id. at 1292. 
 4.  Ibpimin, Honda del Sol Commercial, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gqa-
b3assCA (last visited Mar. 23, 2017). 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Metro–Goldwyn–Mayer, Inc., 900 F. Supp. at 1292. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
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When I introduce the case in class, I typically begin by showing the 
commercial and asking students whether, if they had been in-house counsel 
for Honda, they would have approved going forward with the commercial. 
(The students have not, at that point, read the opinion in the case.) Inevitably, 
several students immediately voice a cautionary note, remarking that they 
would have expected a challenge from the owner of the copyright in the James 
Bond character10 because that character and the character in the commercial 
are, to use the language of copyright doctrine, “substantially similar.” 
A momentary diversion for some background: In the United States, 
copyright law is said to provide an economic incentive to create expressive 
works. A creator of such a work, under this theory, will not have such an 
incentive if others are permitted to copy and distribute her work for sale.11 
Because the copier need recoup only the costs of copying and distribution to 
profit, and not the costs of production, the copier can offer the work for sale 
at a lower price than that of the original author, which ostensibly dissuades 
the author from producing in the first place. Hence, by according the original 
author certain rights to control use of the work for a limited time, including 
the right to transfer that control to another, copyright law provides an 
incentive to create the work in the first place.12 
Of course, the reality of creative production is sometimes very different. 
Some authors are motivated by attributional or reputational concerns and not 
by profit;13 they may not mind reproduction of their work so long as they are 
accurately credited or may want to limit copying for reasons other than purely 
economic ones.14 And regardless of the author’s motivation, U.S. copyright 
 
 10.  Scholars disagree on whether one can have a copyright in a character qua character, or 
whether copyright in a character derives from the copyright in the work of which the character 
is a part. See generally Zahr K. Said, Fixing Copyright in Characters: Literary Perspectives on a Legal 
Problem, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 769 (2013). 
 11.  Copyright law speaks in terms of authorship, which refers to the owner of the rights in the 
work and not necessarily the individual who created the work. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012) (“In the 
case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is 
considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise 
in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.”). 
 12.  Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 
1577–81 (2009). 
 13.  See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513 (2009); Rebecca Tushnet, Payment in Credit: Copyright Law and 
Subcultural Creativity, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135 (2007). 
 14.  For example, an author may refuse to authorize creation of a sequel to her work (e.g., 
in the form of fan fiction) not because she is worried about future income streams but because 
she wants to control the context in which her work appears. See generally Darren Waters, Rowling 
Backs Potter Fan Fiction, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/3753001.stm 
(last updated May 27, 2004, 12:11 PM) (noting that J.K. Rowling generally approves of fan 
fiction so long as it is noncommercial and not X-rated). Creative Commons licenses allow authors 
who prefer to announce preemptive waivers of certain rights to do so while preserving their ability 
to impose limitations on uses of their work by others. See Licensing Types, CREATIVE COMMONS, 
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law does not allow unlimited control of a work by the copyright owner. Fair 
uses, de minimis uses, uses of the ideas a work embodies, certain kinds of sales 
and displays, and various other socially beneficial, lobbied for, or legally 
insignificant uses lie beyond the copyright owner’s reach. But if a use does not 
fall into one of these categories, copyright law is generally unconcerned with 
the copyright owner’s motivations in restricting the use.15 In every copyright 
infringement case, then, there are two fundamental questions to be answered: 
(1) Is the defendant even using the copyright owner’s work in the first 
place?16; and (2) if so, does that use fall into one of the categories that lies 
outside the scope of the owner’s legal right to control the work?17 
It is the first question that gives rise to the doctrine of substantial 
similarity. In many cases, the answer to the question is simple: The defendant 
is, for example, unquestionably copying and distributing an entire musical 
recording or performing the plaintiff’s copyrighted stage play. But in other 
cases, the question becomes more complicated because the defendant has 
created a work that incorporates some, but not all, of the plaintiff’s work, has 
merely been inspired by the plaintiff’s work, or has simply created a work in 
the same genre as the plaintiff’s work. Thus, the two works may be similar on 
their face, but the question is whether they are similar enough to warrant a 
finding of infringement (that is, “substantially similar”). 
So, to return to the Honda case, when students say, after viewing the 
 
https://creativecommons.org/share-your-work/licensing-types-examples (last visited Mar. 24, 2017). 
For example, a Creative Commons license might allow reproduction and distribution of a work so long 
as the work is attributed to the original author. Id. U.S. copyright law does not, in most instances, 
explicitly include attribution as a right of a copyright owner, but copyright owners can require 
attribution in connection with their right to control other uses of their work. 
 15.  One exception is the doctrine of copyright misuse, which has not gained as much 
traction in copyright law as it has in patent law. When judges have invoked the doctrine, it has 
been to call out copyright claims seen as overly strategic. See, e.g., Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale 
Corp., 776 F.3d 692, 696–706 (9th Cir. 2015) (Wardlaw, J., concurring in judgment); Assessment 
Techs. of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 16.  I recognize the implications of using the words “use” and “user” to refer to the activity 
of engaging with creative works but adopt those words here as shorthand for a range of activities. 
See Jessica Litman, Readers’ Copyright, 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 325, 331 n.22 (2011) 
(discussing implications of “users” versus “readers”); cf. Zahr K. Said, A Transactional Theory of 
the Reader in Copyright Law, 102 IOWA L. REV. 605, 609 n.14 (2017) (describing decision to use 
“reading” as the term for engagement with a work); Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: 
The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 751–52 (2012) (discussing implications of 
“users” versus “readers”).  
 17.  Cf. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 
203, 208 (2012) (“In the second step, referred to as the substantial-similarity analysis, the court 
applies the level of scrutiny, i.e., thickness, so chosen to its analysis of the two works—the original 
and the defendant’s copy—to determine whether the copying does indeed rise to the level of an 
infringement. Although no doubt a factual determination, this step operates as a subjective 
evaluation of the different parts of the two works and of their relative contributions to the overall 
significance of the work, both as a quantitative and qualitative matter, in order to assess whether 
the copying amounted to a ‘wrong.’” (footnote omitted)). 
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commercial, that they think the commercial might infringe the copyright in 
the James Bond character, I then ask: “How do you know that the character 
in the Honda commercial is James Bond?” That question, in turn, leads us to 
compile a list of characteristics that signal James Bond, many of which seem 
entirely generic in isolation: wearing a tuxedo, speaking in a British accent, 
maintaining composure while engaging with villains, driving a fancy sports 
car, and being accompanied by an attractive woman.18 Yet despite the 
vagueness of the items on the list, most of the students “know” that the Honda 
protagonist is meant to be James Bond, and the only remaining question in 
their minds is whether Honda could mount a plausible fair use claim on the 
grounds that the commercial is engaging in parody.19 
Rarely, however, do we explicitly discuss the process by which the 
students came to understand James Bond as a character or the process by 
which they compared the image of that character in their minds with the 
character they saw in the commercial.20 Nor do I spend much time querying 
the moral basis for the conclusion (by some students) that Honda’s failure to 
secure permission to include the character in the advertisement was wrongful, 
although this conclusion is much more contested among the group.21 In other 
words (and to my discredit), we do not attempt to rigorously unpack what they 
are doing as readers when they determine whether Bond and the Honda 
protagonist are “substantially similar” or when they inevitably go on to invoke 
the Austin Powers franchise, another “substantially similar” (but almost 
certainly fair) use of the James Bond character. 
Professor Said’s article, A Transactional Theory of the Reader in Copyright 
Law, highlights the importance of asking these questions, encouraging more 
deliberate attention—by scholars, courts, and juries—to the process of 
engaging with creative works as an active exercise between author and 
reader.22 Relying predominantly on the work of literary theorist Louise 
Rosenblatt, who offered a nuanced version of reader-response theory that 
 
 18.  The protagonist of the commercial requests neither a shaken nor a stirred martini.  
 19.  In this regard, the students correctly predict the course of the court’s analysis. The 
court determined that Honda was not likely to succeed on the merits of a fair use defense. 
Metro–Goldwyn–Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1300–01 (C.D. Cal. 1995). 
 20.  Some of this might be affected by the fact that both processes engage with visual works 
rather than texts, assuming that the students’ knowledge came from the films rather than from 
the Ian Fleming novels. Tushnet, supra note 16, at 746 (“In MGM, words are abstract, whereas 
visuals are concrete, and thus the scope of an audiovisual work’s copyright is broader than the 
scope of a written work’s copyright.”); see Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 660–61 (7th Cir. 
2004) (“The description of a character in prose leaves much to the imagination, even when the 
description is detailed . . . . A reader of unillustrated fiction completes the work in his mind; the 
reader of a comic book or the viewer of a movie is passive.”). 
 21.  Cf. Balganesh, supra note 17, at 251 (“The similarity analysis thus operates as 
copyright’s correlative framework, in which the defendant’s actions are examined through the 
lens of a right-duty relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.”). 
 22.  See generally Said, supra note 16. 
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limits the range of reasonable responses to those cued by the text,23 Professor 
Said joins those scholars who call for juries (and judges) to be provided with 
more guidance in copyright infringement cases, both to answer the question 
of what should be excluded in the comparison of two works and to shape the 
ultimate process of comparison.24 For example, as she persuasively suggests 
(using Rosenblatt’s terminology), juries should be allowed to rely on experts 
when they are engaged in the process of efferent reading (the process of 
extracting information from a text).25 Juries ostensibly engage in efferent 
reading when answering the second question (as I have framed it above) in a 
copyright infringement case—determining which aspects of the defendant’s 
use fall into categories that lie beyond the scope of the plaintiff’s rights. By 
contrast, Professor Said suggests, juries are in need of less assistance when they 
are engaged in the process of aesthetic reading (responding to the work as a 
whole).26 As applied to a copyright infringement case, this suggestion is 
designed to help answer the first question (again, as I have framed it)—
whether the defendant is even making use of the plaintiff’s work. Ultimately, 
contends Professor Said, “[b]y ignoring the realities of how people actually 
engage with art, courts overestimate what jurors can do, and underestimate 
their need for guidance on both law and how to engage with art.”27 
As my previous work suggests,28 I am sympathetic to Professor Said’s 
project writ large. Focusing our attention in copyright law on the audience 
aligns with the goal of making creative works available for others to read, 
interpret, and build upon. In this vein, a reader-response approach to 
copyright law can be particularly valuable when the meaning of a work is 
directly at issue, such as when the question is whether, in the fair use inquiry, 
the defendant has engaged in a transformative use of the plaintiff’s work. In 
such an inquiry, the decision-maker must determine whether transformation 
should be judged only with respect to the defendant’s intentions and efforts 
or also (or instead) by how the work is experienced by its various audiences.29 
 
 23.  Id. at 618. See generally LOUISE M. ROSENBLATT, THE READER, THE TEXT, THE POEM: THE 
TRANSACTIONAL THEORY OF THE LITERARY WORK (1978). 
 24.  See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh et al., Judging Similarity, 100 IOWA L. REV. 267, 289 
(2014) (contending that juries are influenced in their substantial similarity analysis by factors that 
“ought to be kept out of the copyright system altogether”); Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for 
Proving Copyright Infringement, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 719 (2010) (arguing in favor of 
enhanced expert guidance at both stages of the infringement analysis and noting that jurors are not 
likely to be fully equipped to filter out nonprotectable elements of the work at the second stage).  
 25.  Said, supra note 16, at 622, 636–40. 
 26.  Id. at 638–43. 
 27.  Id. at 608. 
 28.  See generally Laura A. Heymann, Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response, 
31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445 (2008). 
 29.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582 (1994) (noting that the 
threshold fair use question in that case was “whether a parodic character may reasonably be 
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Reader-response theory thus allows the doctrine to expand the notion of how 
a work conveys meaning, making room for differences that might not exist 
with an author-centered approach to meaning. 
But this then means that the question of whether two works are 
substantially similar must also, under reader-response theory, be similarly 
expansive, even though Professor Said’s approach would seem to favor a 
cabining of the range of interpretations. This is not, to be clear, a critique of 
Professor Said’s thoughtful work but rather an acknowledgment of the 
breadth of reasonable engagement with creative works.30 Courts can tell juries 
that in making a determination of substantial similarity they should or should 
not consider certain aspects of the two works, much as courts tell juries not to 
consider the prejudicial testimony just objected to in court. (In both cases, 
the admonition may represent the triumph of hope over experience.) But 
beyond that, it is unclear how we could ever truly say, except in the cases that 
are not likely to make it to a jury in the first place, that any jury was right or 
wrong in deeming two works to be similar or dissimilar—in part, because we 
are unlikely to agree on just what “substantially similar” means. Were the 
students who concluded that the Honda commercial “took too much” of the 
James Bond character right or wrong? What about the students for whom 
Jason Bourne or Ethan Hunt came more quickly to mind?31 
The challenge is that copyright doctrine has never put much meat on the 
bones of “substantial similarity.” In many courts, substantial similarity is 
described only as “whether an average lay observer would recognize the 
alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.”32 In 
Arnstein v. Porter, a case involving a comparison between two musical 
compositions, the court framed the inquiry as “whether defendant took from 
 
perceived”); see also Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707 (2d Cir. 2013) (“What is critical is how 
the work in question appears to the reasonable observer, not simply what an artist might say about 
a particular piece or body of work.”). See also generally Andrew Gilden & Timothy Greene, Fair Use 
for the Rich and Fabulous?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 88 (2013) (cautioning that focus on 
community response should not be limited to privileged communities). 
 30.  Like Professor Said, I focus here on copyrighted works that would typically be described 
as having aesthetic appeal, even though copyright also extends to works, such as software, that 
are not engaged with by audiences in the same way as other works. 
 31.  See Said, supra note 16, at 612 (“No scholarship has attempted to articulate a broad 
theory of what copyright case law’s judge and jury do as readers when they address the question of 
infringement.”). For the uninitiated, see, e.g., THE BOURNE IDENTITY (Universal Studios 2002); 
THE BOURNE SUPREMACY (Universal Studios 2004); THE BOURNE ULTIMATUM (Universal Studios 
2007); see also MISSION: IMPOSSIBLE (Paramount Pictures 1996); MISSION: IMPOSSIBLE 2 
(Paramount Pictures 2000); and MISSION: IMPOSSIBLE 3 (Paramount Pictures 2006). 
 32.  Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966); see also Peter Pan 
Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) (noting that although the 
two designs at issue in the case were not identical, “the ordinary observer, unless he set out to 
detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as 
the same. That is enough; and indeed, it is all that can be said . . .”). 
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plaintiff’s works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who 
comprise the audience for whom such popular music is composed, that 
defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the 
plaintiff.”33 Scholars have critiqued the simplicity of these formulations,34 
noting that juries are given little information on how to conduct this task 
beyond “general abstract statements” directing them to consider the 
significance of both qualitative and quantitative aspects of the works.35 
To be sure, copyright doctrine requires the concept of substantial 
similarity—otherwise, as the Second Circuit noted in Nichols v. Universal Picture 
Corp., “a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations.”36 At the other 
extreme, however, it simply cannot constitute copyright infringement to be 
inspired by another’s work, or to use its themes, even if those who originated 
the themes would experience some level of pique in not being credited for 
that use. Two sports writers can write a column putting forward the same 
theory of why the team named the favorite to win the Super Bowl failed to 
achieve its goal. The second writer may be excoriated for being unoriginal, 
but unless she uses similar enough phrasing, structure, or arrangement, her 
faults are journalistic, not legal, much as the student who copies wholesale a 
theory for a term paper without crediting her source has committed academic 
misconduct but not necessarily copyright infringement. 
It is the area between these two poles, however, that remains undefined, 
and perhaps inevitably so. Without a substantial overhaul of copyright 
doctrine to cabin the ways in which two works can be deemed legally similar, 
how can we say that a jury has answered the question incorrectly?37 We can 
use Professor Said’s inventive Appendix to her article, in which she 
demonstrates the difference between efferent reading and aesthetic reading 
by having the reader engage with a set of song lyrics, a poem, and a painting, 
as a jumping-off point. Consider, for example, the lyrics to the Carla Bruni 
 
 33.  Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 34.  See, e.g., Balganesh et al., supra note 24, at 269 (“Copyright law thus seems to assume 
that the question of substantial similarity can continue to remain a simple comparison of the two 
works, even in the face of extensive factual evidence that bears directly on the dispute in 
question.”); Tushnet, supra note 16, at 717, 719 (suggesting that doctrine of substantial similarity 
for visual works “just is; there is no way to break it down or describe it” and just because “two 
works produce the same emotional state in a viewer does not mean that they are the same”); id. 
at 738–39 (proposing that substantial similarity should be abandoned entirely and that “[a] 
reproduction right that is truly a reproduction right would cover only pure copying and copying so 
nearly exact that observers would be inclined to see two works as the same”). 
 35.  Balganesh et al., supra note 24, at 274 (citing Final Charge to Jury and Special Verdict 
Form at 14, Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google, Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (2014) (No. C 10-03561 WHA)). 
 36.  Nicholas v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 37.  Cf. Zahr K. Said, Reforming Copyright Interpretation, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469, 474 
(2015) (“[I]n copyright litigation, the works at issue must be interpreted for legal purposes, and 
here it is indisputable not only that a fixed meaning may attach but that frequently for an 
outcome to be reached, it must attach so that copyright doctrines can be applied.”). 
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song, originally written in French but translated into English by Professor Said 
for the benefit of readers not familiar enough with the language of the 
original.38 Once Professor Said alerts the reader to the availability of the 
translation, the translation then becomes for some the work under discussion, 
which she uses to introduce the concepts of efferent and aesthetic reading to 
her audience.39 These readers will see a translation and its original as 
substantially similar only if they believe (or are told) that the translation is an 
accurate one—meaning that they will experience the work in the same way as 
they would if they were able to read the poem in its original language.40 
Without that knowledge, those readers would visually compare the text of the 
original to the text of the translation and conclude that they are largely 
dissimilar. 
But for readers who understand the language of the original, the 
similarity question will no doubt be influenced by their assessment of the 
choices made by the translator. Should the sound of a clock in the last line of 
the Bruni lyrics, for example, be rendered in the translation as written for a 
French-speaking audience (“tic tac tic tac”) or rendered to be more familiar 
to an English-speaking audience (“tick tock tick tock”)? Should “ranger les 
souvenirs” be translated as “tidy up my memories” or “store my memories”? 
Are these two renderings substantially similar because they are “close 
enough”? Should this difference have any legal relevance? 
These questions also arise in the second example in Professor Said’s 
Appendix. Here, Professor Said provides context for the reader to better 
appreciate the poem by Adrienne Rich—namely, that it invokes the themes 
of an earlier poem by Gerard Manley Hopkins.41 Professor Said’s layered 
description of the themes and metaphors of Rich’s poem provides a starting 
 
 38.  Said, supra note 16, at 615, 648–49. 
 39.  Id. at 629–30. 
 40.  See Sonia Colina, Evaluation/Assessment, in 2 HANDBOOK OF TRANSLATION STUDIES 43, 
45 (Yves Gambier & Luc van Doorslaer eds., 2011) (“Reader-response approaches evaluate the 
quality of a translation by determining whether readers respond to it in the same way readers 
respond to the source. . . . It is not difficult to see the problems involved in trying to measure 
reader-response; one in fact wonders whether it is actually possible to determine whether two 
responses are equivalent, given that even monolingual texts can trigger non-equivalent reactions 
from slightly different groups of readers.” (citation omitted)); Robert Kirk Walker & Ben 
Depoorter, Unavoidable Aesthetic Judgments in Copyright Law: A Community of Practice Standard, 109 
NW. U.L. REV. 343, 375 (2015) (“A work’s ‘total concept and feel’ is inherently subject to the 
quirks of individual taste and sophistication, and so decisions of law based on it are no more likely 
to be consistent than decisions subscribing to the doctrine of avoidance.”). U.S. copyright law 
today considers a translation to be a derivative work. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining 
“derivative work” to include translations). But see Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 208 (C.C.E.D. 
Pa. 1853) (“A translation may, in loose phraseology, be called a transcript or copy of her thoughts 
or conceptions, but in no correct sense can it be called a copy of her book.”). 
 41.  Said, supra note 16, at 615–16. 
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point for the reader to engage with the work,42 but is a reader who does not 
see these metaphors or who sees more dissimilarity than similarity necessarily 
wrong, even if we acknowledge that some interpretations are too unmoored 
from the text to be reasonable? What about a viewer who cannot appreciate 
the visual perspective in the Lawrence painting that Professor Said describes, 
to take the Appendix’s third example,43 or who does not perceive color in the 
same way as other viewers? 
Ultimately, we cannot escape interpretation in the law, and most 
interpretations are only as correct as the last body to pronounce them so.44 
The jury functions as readers not only when it compares the two works at issue 
but also when it hears opening and closing statements, attempts to 
understand jury instructions, or listens to the statements made by fellow jurors 
during deliberations. Engaging with the works at issue is reading, to be sure, 
but in any litigated case, it’s reading all the way down. Professor Said is 
particularly persuasive, then, when she contends that the first step should be 
to make the jury responsible only for comparing the two works, leaving the 
judge to follow up by deciding whether that similarity is legally cognizable.45 
Where I am, perhaps, more skeptical than Professor Said is in my lack of 
confidence that further guidance will result in any real difference in case 
outcomes. Any case that makes it to a jury will be one about which reasonable 
readers can disagree.46 
Perhaps this is because, to use Rosenblatt’s terminology, most of the tasks 
readers are asked to accomplish in a copyright infringement case involve 
aesthetic reading rather than efferent reading. Determining whether two 
works are similar because they both invoke the same genre or tropes is not a 
task that can be accomplished in the same way that one can count the number 
of times the word “green” appears in a poem or decide whether a film falls 
into the broad category of “romantic comedy” or “violent psychological 
thriller.”47 Assessing whether two works are similar enough to warrant an 
inference that the defendant copied from the plaintiff is a slightly more 
efferent task insofar as the goal is clearly identified (did the defendant copy 
or not?), but accomplishing that task still requires an assessment of how 
 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  See id. at 616, 650. 
 44.  Cf. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (“We are not final because we are 
infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result). 
 45.  Said, supra note 16, at 641, 644 (“By asking juries to answer questions about their 
experiences of a work of art, the court could determine whether what juries found similar about 
two works was in fact protectable or not.”). 
 46.  Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247, 293 (1998) 
(“Explicit references to the attitudes of actual people [in the substantial similarity analysis] does 
direct a judge’s attention away from her own subjective appraisal of works, but answers will rarely 
be found because actual people will likely disagree over the interpretation of works.”). 
 47.  See Said, supra note 16, at 629. 
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similar is similar enough. Identifying the ways in which two works are similar 
does not mean that those are the only ways in which the works could be 
similar, or that those similarities are in any way significant. Guidance on how 
to engage these questions can be helpful, but it can ultimately be no more 
determinative than a cultural critic who hopes to persuade her readers of the 
value of her expertise.48 
The problem, then, with the substantial similarity inquiry is not that juries 
are given insufficient information about the process of deciding— it’s that the 
doctrine has never made the endgame clear. How, ultimately, do we know 
when a defendant’s work has taken too much? When Walter Benjamin wrote 
of a work’s “aura,” criticizing reproductions that shared many aesthetic or 
material qualities with the original as nevertheless deficient, perhaps he was 
capturing something of the conclusion for at least some readers.49 We can 
issue calls for more in the way of juror education: how to understand the 
nuances of a particular genre, whether to read a work quickly or with care and 
time, or whether to bring any prior familiarity with either work into the 
analysis. We can attempt to focus the analysis by asking jurors to decide 
whether the works are economic or aesthetic substitutes for one another, 
although that is not likely to be particularly useful.50 But in the end, isn’t a 
juror likely to be motivated most by the fact that she “knows” that the man in 
the commercial is supposed to be James Bond and that such a use is somehow 
“improper,” regardless of whatever guidance she has been given? What kind 
of guidance as to similarity, beyond encouragement to engage in the task 
more ardently, could yield a different result? 
Perhaps, then, the question we should be focusing our attention on is not 
simply how jurors and judges read but also how jurors and judges as readers 
become scholars and critics, attempting to persuade others that their reading 
is correct. If the question of copyright infringement is decided by a jury, our 
reader cannot be a collection of individuals, each coming to his or her own 
conclusion. The group must cohere around an agreed-upon result, if not an 
agreed-upon rationale, subject to invalidation only if some other reader (the 
trial judge or an appellate panel) deems the result to be so unreasonable as 
 
 48.  Id. (noting that an efferent reading, as an objective exercise, “can be wrong,” but an 
aesthetic reading, as a subjective process, is not likely to yield “a set of correct answers”; indeed, 
an aesthetic reading “need merely to chart an interpretive course that responds to cues in the 
text, rather than cues imagined by the reader”). 
 49.  Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility: Second 
Version, in THE WORK OF ART IN THE AGE OF ITS TECHNOLOGICAL REPRODUCIBILITY, AND OTHER 
WRITINGS ON MEDIA 19, 22–31 (Michael W. Jennings et al. eds., 2008).  
 50.  The strong similarity of the melodic lines of “He’s So Fine” and “My Sweet Lord” does 
not mean that a performer’s set list would include either one interchangeably. See generally Bright 
Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff’d sub nom. 
ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983). 
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to warrant reconsideration.51 Some jurors may have deep familiarity with the 
works or genres at issue in a case; others may be experiencing the works for 
the first time. Reader-response theory has helped copyright law to understand 
the validity of individual experience for individual reception of a work, but 
copyright doctrine has not yet sufficiently explored what the theory can tell 
us for how groups engage in the process of reading and interpretation as a 
collective body and the process by which an interpretation gains traction in a 
community to become canon or cultural knowledge.52 
We are, as Professor Said thoughtfully reminds us, engaged in constant 
acts of reading.53 Her calls for more open conversations, both inside and 
outside the courtroom, about how we read are well worth heeding. The 
process by which we read, engage, and interpret, both together and apart, 
should be the next set of experiences that copyright law should take into 
account. 
 
 
 51. See generally Michael S. Pardo, Group Agency and Legal Proof; Or, Why the Jury Is an “It,” 56 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1793 (2015) (discussing concept of jury as single entity with agency separate 
from that of its individual members). 
 52.  See JANICE A. RADWAY, READING THE ROMANCE: WOMEN, PATRIARCHY, AND POPULAR 
LITERATURE 8 (1984) (“The analytic focus [of a cultural analysis of romance novels] must shift 
from the text itself, taken in isolation, to the complex social event of reading . . . .”). 
 53.  See Said, supra note 16, at 607–10, 618 n.52. 
